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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDER THE
SUPERVISORY POWER: United States v. Payner
Since first exercising federal supervisory power to suppress
evidence in a federal criminal prosecution, the Supreme Court
has justified the doctrine as a means of preserving the integrity of
the federal judiciary.1 At the same time, the Court has curtailed
the reach of the exclusionary rule, which suppresses evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment's search and seizure
clause, in order to deter police misconduct.2 These two doctrines
collided in United States v. Payner.3 In Payner, the Supreme Court
held that a trial court had improperly exercised its supervisory
power when it excluded evidence-otherwise admissible under
the exclusionary rule-that federal agents had seized in deliberate
violation of the constitutional rights of a third party. 4 To insure
that courts would not use the supervisory power to evade the
limits of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, the Court
deemed deterrence of police misconduct, not preservation of judi-
cial integrity, to be the primary rationale for evidence exclusion
under the supervisory power.5
By applying the deterrence rationale of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule to the supervisory power, the Court ren-
dered the two doctrines coterminous in challenges to evidence
seized in violation of the search and seizure clause, thereby
obscuring the distinctions it had previously drawn between the
two suppression doctrines. 6 Yet the decision enabled the Court
to preserve the balance it had struck in previous exclusionary rule
cases between society's interest in deterring unconstitutional police
conduct and in promoting the truth-seeking function of criminal
adjudications. 7 Although the Court's decision in Payner may ren-
der the supervisory power a superfluous remedy for constitution-
' See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); notes 33-44, 50-61, and accom-
panying text infra.
2 See notes 21-32 and accompanying text infra.
3 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
4 Id. at 2446-47.
Id. at 2445-46.
6 See notes 16-20, 50-61, 82-85, and accompanying text infra.
See notes 27-32, 81-85, and accompanying text infra.
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ally prohibited searches and seizures, lower courts may continue
to use the power to exclude evidence obtained through statutory
violations.8
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
An examination of the development of the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule illuminates Payner's effect on the supervis-
ory power. The rule protects fourth amendment rights by render-
ing evidence obtained from defendants in violation of the Con-
stitution's search and seizure clause9 inadmissible in criminal
prosecutions. The Supreme Court established the rule in Weeks v.
United States" to exclude unlawfully seized evidence. The Court
reasoned that use of the evidence would produce "a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused.""1
As the application of the rule evolved, its underlying
rationale shifted, causing uncertainty among courts and commen-
tators about whether the rule was constitutionally compelled or a
mere judicial creation."2  The Weeks Court designed the rule to
protect personal constitutional rights of defendants.1 3 In Mapp v.
a See notes 90-91, and accompanying text infra.
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
" Id. at 398.
1" See Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1117, 1119 (1978).
13 232 U.S. at 390-92, 394, 398. Both before and during his trial, the defendant unsuc-
cessfully requested the court to return evidence seized by a United States marshal who
had searched his room without a warrant. Id. at 386-88. He also objected to the use of the
evidence against him. Id. at 388. The Court stated:
We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question were taken
from the house of the accused by an official of the United States acting under
color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the defen-
dant; that having made a seasonable application for their return, which was
heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing
the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that the
court should have restored these letters to the accused. In holding them and
permitting their use upon the trial, we think prejudicial error was committed.
Id. at 398.
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Ohio,14 the Court observed that since Weeks, it had consistently
held the exclusionary rule "to be a clear, specific, and constitu-
tionally required ... safeguard."15 After characterizing the rule
as a substantive constitutional right, the Mapp Court acknowl-
edged its utility as a deterrent of governmental misconduct' 6 and
as a means of preserving judicial integrity.' 7 Dissenting in Mapp,
14 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15 Id. at 648. The Court referred to the rule as "our constitutional exclusionary doc-
trine," id. at 659, and the "most important constitutional privilege," id. at 656, of the search
and seizure clause. In holding the exclusionary rule enforceable against the states through
the fourteenth amendment, id. at 644, the Court noted that the factual support for its
earlier failure in Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25 (1949), to extend the exclusionary rule to
the states "while not basically relevant to the constitutional consideration, could not, in any
analysis, now be deemed controlling." 367 U.S. at 653.
16 367 U.S. at 651.
17 Id. at 659-60. Both the deterrence and judicial integrity rationales have generated a
great deal of controversy. Critics of the deterrence rationale say that little or no conclusive
data exist to demonstrate that the suppression of "tainted" evidence has any deterrent
effect on law enforcement activity. See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A
Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 33-34. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970), said that the suppression sanc-
tion "is both conceptually sterile and practically ineffective." Id. at 415.
Critics of the judicial integrity rationale contend that courts, while attempting to nur-
ture respect for the law by excluding illegally-seized evidence, may nonetheless generate
disrespect and disillusionment by freeing guilty defendants because of abstract notions of
the sanctity of the judicial process. Chief Justice Burger has commented:
If a majority-or even a substantial minority-of the people in any given
community ... come to believe that law enforcement is being frustrated by
what laymen call "technicalities," there develops a sour and bitter feeling that is
psychologically and sociologically unhealthy. ... I do not challenge these rules
of law [applying the suppression doctrine]. But I do suggest that we may have
come the full circle from the place where Brandeis stood, and that a vast
number of people are losing respect for law and the administration of justice
because they think that the Suppression Doctrine is defeating justice.
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 22 (1964). Others challenge
the judicial integrity rationale because no analogous rule "is observed in other common law
jurisdictions, such as England and Canada, whose courts are otherwise regarded as models
of judicial decorum and fairness." Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 CHI. L. REv. 665, 669 (1970) (footnote omitted).
Finally, some critics question the validity of the exclusionary rule in general. They
argue that the "disparity... between the error committed by the police ... and the
windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of
proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
490 (1976) (footnote omitted); accord, Allen, supra, at 36. Proponents of this view contend
that the trier of fact performs a vital function for the accused as well as for society. Thus,
the benefits to the defendant must be great to justify the costs of suppression to society. In
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), the Supreme Court stated: "Any claim for
the exclusion of evidence logically relevant in criminal prosecutions is heavily handicapped.
It must be justified by an over-riding public policy expressed in the Constitution or the law
of the land." Id. at 340. See also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976).
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Justice Harlan argued that the rule was not constitutionally com-
pelled,'1 8 but derived from the Supreme Court's supervisory
power over the federal judicial system. He viewed the rule as "a
basic federal remedy ... which, by penalizing past official mis-
conduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future." 19
Later decisions preserved the rule's constitutional basis, but in-
creasingly emphasized the deterrence rationale.20 Recently, in
United States v. Calandra,21 the Court characterized the exclusion-
ary rule as a 'judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved.""2 Subsequent decisions adhered to Calandra's view of
Others contend that the rule serves only a defendant whom the tainted evidence in-
criminates; it benefits neither the victim nor society. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184a, at
51-52 (McNaughten ed. 1961) ("[The rule serves] neither to protect the victim nor to
punish the offender but rather to compensate the guilty victim by acquittal and to punish
the public by unloosing the criminal in their midst .... "); Oaks, supra, at 736.
Critics of the exclusionary rule have called for its modification or abolition. Suggested
remedies include statutory sanctions against unlawful police activity, more effective tort
actions, more stringent internal review and discipline of police misconduct, and abolition of
the standing requirement, which limits the class of defendants who can invoke the rule. See
Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1042-43, 1050-51 (1974);
Oaks, supra, at 673-74, 756-57; Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 342, 366 (1967). For an explanation of the standing require-
ment, see note 27 infra.
18 Id. at 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan believed that the Court in Mapp
had held that the rule was constitutionally mandated "because no one, I suppose, would
suggest that this Court possesses any general supervisory power over the state courts." Id.
19 Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
21 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
22 Id. at 348 (footnote omitted). Although commentators agree that the exclusionary
rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a constitutional right, they disagree whether
the Court has authority to create such a remedy. On one side of the debate, Professor
Monaghan places the rule in a category of "quasi-constitutional" law-"a substructure of
substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority from,
but not required by, various constitutional provisions." Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Ternm-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975). The creation
of such rules is, in effect, an exercise of a common law power. Id. at 3. Although conceding
that the "Court's authority to [impose such rules] is not evident," id. at 8, Monaghan con-
cludes that the Court's tradition of defining the limits of governmental power "make [the
Court] a singularly appropriate institution to fashion many of the details as well as the
framework of the constitutional guarantees." Id. at 19 (footnote omitted).
Professors Schrock and Welsh, the leading proponents of the opposing view, consider
the concept of a constitutional common law to be "neither constitutional nor common law
but pragmatism without either precedent or principle." Schrock & Welsh, supra note 12, at
1124. They argue that the theory of judicial review, set forth in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and the constitutional principles of separation of powers and
federalism foreclose any subconstitutional power of the Court. Schrock & Welsh, supra, at
1127. In addition, Schrock and Welsh point to the absence of any textual authority for the
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the nature of the exclusionary rule.13  In Stone v. Powell,24 for
example, the Court recognized that the rule is "a judicially created
means of effectuating" fourth amendment rights, 25 and denied
federal habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner after the state had
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his allega-
tion that illegally seized evidence invalidated his conviction. 26
Because the Court no longer regards the exclusionary rule as
a personal constitutional right, it applies the rule only when exclu-
sion of tainted evidence furthers society's interests. To make this
determination, the Court balances society's interest in making all
evidence available to aid the truth-finding process against the
harm caused by the use of illegally obtained evidence. 27  In
concept. Id. at 1145. They assert that Monaghan "can ultimately do no better than infer
authority from utility," id. at 1131, and use his suggestion "that such legislative rules can be
adequately rationalized as constitutional common law," Monaghan, supra, at 23, as an illus-
tration. Schrock and Welsh urge that the Court "should confine itself to Marbury-style
constitutional interpretation," Schrock & Welsh, supra, at 1171, rather than "assume and
exercise the power to impose on coordinate departments, and especially on the states, rules
developed at a subconstitutional level." Id. at 1171.
23 In United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), the court emphasized
the deterrence rationale in employing a "good-faith exception" to the judicially-created
exclusionary rule-evidence will not be excluded when a law enforcement officer acts in
the good faith belief that his conduct is constitutional and he has a reasonable basis for that
belief. Because deterrence of future police misconduct justifies the rule, it "is not applied
in those contexts where it does not effectively deter official misconduct." Id. at 842. The
court quoted Professor Wright's observation that "'a police officer will not be deterred
from an illegal search if he does not know that it is illegal.'" Id. at 842 (quoting Wright,
Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TExAS L. REv. 736, 740 (1972)). See
also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 538 (1975).
24 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
25 Id. at 482.
26 Id.
27 The Court used interest-balancing to limit the application of the exclusionary rule
when it was regarded as constitutionally required. Many decisions have echoed the view
expressed in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969):
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights
the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the suppres-
sion of probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is
weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But we are not convinced
that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defend-
ants would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting
those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of
all the evidence which exposes the truth.
Id. at 174-75. Accord, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); United States v. Ceccolini,
435 U.S. 268, 275 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1976); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-52 (1974).
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Alderman v. United States 28 the Court struck such a balance, albeit a
curious one, 2:" by holding that a defendant may invoke the
exclusionary rule only when police conduct violates his own
fourth amendment rights. 30 The Court reasoned that the deter-
rence of police misconduct did not justify impeding the truth-
finding function when police violate a third party's fourth
amendment rights.3' Nor does such police conduct reduce the
probative value of otherwise admissible evidence.3
Concern with disclosure of all relevant evidence in the truth-finding process led the
Supreme Court to develop the concept of standing, which limited the class of defendants
who could invoke the exclusionary rule. In Olmstead v. United States, 477 U.S. 438 (1928),
the Court held that a defendant must have a property interest in the object of the search
and seizure to allege a violation of his fourth amendment rights. The Olmstead property
requirement prevailed until the Court radically altered the boundaries of the doctrine. In
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Court granted standing to a defendant
charged with possession of items seized in the search, id. at 264, or to "anyone legitimately
on premises where a search occurs... when its fruits are proposed to be used against
him." Id. at 267. When faced with the illegal wiretapping of a public telephone booth, the
Court recognized that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In Katz the Court expanded standing to encompass viola-
tions of what justice Harlan, in his concurrence, called a defendant's "reasonable" expecta-
tion of privacy. Id. at 361. Katz is also significant for its extension of standing to cover
instances of electronic surveillance in which no physical trespass occurs.
In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court reversed this expansive trend. The
Court rejected standing analysis in favor of an inquiry focused on substantive fourth
amendment rights. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated, "[The better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept
of standing." Id. at 139. The analysis examined "whether the disputed search and sei-
zure ... infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was de-
signed to protect." Id. at 140. The Court rejected petitioners' fourth amendment claim
because they had asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the searched
premises or the seized object. The Court explicitly overruled Jones in United States v.
Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). Moreover, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556
(1980), the Court held that the mere ownership of property does not entitle a defendant to
challenge an illegal search and seizure when the property is in the custody of a third party.
Id. at 4887.
28 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
29 As one commentator noted, "The standing requirement seems unrelated to the fac-
tors relevant in such a balancing process, such as the relative egregiousness of police infrac-
tions of privacy, the relative susceptibility of police practices to judicial deterrence, the
relative ease of acquiring evidence by other means, and so on." The Supreme Court, 1968
Tenn, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 169 (1969).
30 394 U.S. at 171-72. "Fourth Amendment rights ... may not be vicariously asserted.
... [We think there is a substantial difference for constitutional purposes between pre-
venting the incrimination of a defendant through the very evidence illegally seized from
him and suppressing evidence on the motion of a party who cannot claim this predicate for
exclusion." Id. at 174.
21 Id. at 174-75.
32 One commentator explains reliability of illegally seized evidence in the following
manner:
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B. Exclusion of Evidence Under the Supervisory Power
The Supreme Court first invoked its supervisory power over
federal courts as an independent basis for excluding evidence in
McNabb v. United States.33  In McNabb, federal agents arrested the
defendants and held them for two days without a statutorily
required 34 preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed
their convictions, holding that confessions obtained by federal of-
ficers during the illegal detention were inadmissible in federal
court.33  The Court grounded its decision on its "supervisory au-
thority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts"' 36 rather than on a constitutional 37 or statutory provi-
sion.3" The supervisory authority conferred inherent power to
formulate "rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal pro-
secutions" 39 that were necessary to avoid "making the courts
themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." 40  Al-
though the statute in McNabb did not explicitly forbid the use of
evidence procured during an illegal detention, 41 the Court
An application of the exclusionary rule ... is probably more vulnerable to
a complaint of "freeing the guilty" than the exclusion of an improperly obtained
confession or eyewitness identification. Physical evidence is no less reliable
when illegally obtained. The nature of burglary tools, blood stains, or white
powder in a glassine wrapper is not changed by the circumstances of their ac-
quisition. In contrast, identifications obtained by faulty lineup procedures are
of doubtful reliability. So are confessions obtained by coercive methods.... In
addition, under cur rent law enforcement methods, evidence obtained by a
search is likely to be vital to conviction in most types of crimes where searches
are commonly involved .... Confessions are generally less vital.
Oaks, supra note 17, at 737-38; accord, Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
33 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4 Act of March 1, 1897, ch. 125, § 9, 20 Stat. 341 (formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. §
593 (1927); repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 21, 62 Stat. 862; current version
at FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a); Act of March 2, 1901, ch. 814, 31 Stat. 956 (formerly codified at
18 U.S.C. § 595 (1927); repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992;
current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)).
31 318 U.S. at 345. The trial court, applying a rule that excluded only coerced confes-
sions, had admitted into evidence confessions obtained during the illegal detention. Id. at
338-39 n.5. The Supreme Court held the confession inadmissible regardless of whether it
was coerced. Id. at 345.
36 Id. at 341.
" "In the view we take of the case.., it becomes unnecessary to reach the Constitu-
tional issue pressed upon us." Id. at 340. The Court added that the scope of its "reviewing
power ... is not confined to ascertainment of Constitutional validity." Id.
" "Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured." Id. at 345.
19 Id. at 341.
40 Id. at 345.
41 Id.
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reasoned that admission of such evidence would undermine both
congressional policy 42 and the "integrity of the criminal proceed-
ing." 43 Thus, without claiming the right to oversee law enforce-
ment activities directly, the McNabb Court, under the "rubric of
keeping [its] own skirts clean," 44 simply denied the judicial
machinery to government agents who had engaged in illegal or
unfair conduct.4 5
Since McNabb, the Court has continued to exercise super-
visory power to suppress evidence obtained by federal gov-
ernmental misconduct.46 Because this power is rooted in the fed-
eral judiciary's authority to oversee federal proceedings, the Court
has not applied the power to upset state court convictions in the
absence of federal participation. 47 The Court has used the
supervisory power to ensure a level of fairness 48 in the judicial
42 Id.
43 Id. at 342. "We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of the courts as agencies
of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence
secured under the circumstances revealed here." Id. at 347.
44 Note, The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. Rev. 1656, 1663 (1963).
5 "[W]e confine ourselves to our limited function as the court of ultimate review of the
standards formulated and applied by federal courts in the trial of criminal cases. We are
not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts themselves become
instruments of law enforcement." 318 U.S. at 347.
46 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) ("We cannot sanction this ex-
tended delay, resulting in confession, without subordinating the general rule of prompt
arraignment to the discretion of arresting officers in finding exceptional circumstances for
its disregard."); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) ("(The government wit-
ness], by his testimony, has poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot
be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity."); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S.
410, 414 (1948) ("[Ihe arresting officer in effect conceded that the confessions here were
'the fruits of wrongdoing' by the police officers.").
4' See, e.g.,Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one, I
suppose, would suggest that this Court possesses any general supervisory power over the
state courts."). The Court, however, has excluded from a state criminal proceeding evi-
dence seized illegally by a federal agent. In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), state
authorities sought to prosecute a defendant using evidence which had already been
excluded from a federal prosecution. The defendant petitioned to prevent transfer of the
evidence from the federal court and to enjoin the federal agent from testifying in the state
proceeding. Id. at 214-16. The Court stressed that the federal agent had violated the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
The District Court is not asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to inter-
fere with state agencies in enforcement of state law. . .. The only relief asked
is against a federal agent, who obtained the property as a result of the abuse of
process issued by a United States Commissioner.
Id. at 216 (citation omitted). But see Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961) (Court de-
nied exclusion where federal agents arrested defendant without a warrant, initiated no
federal prosecution, but gave narcotics taken from defendant to state authorities).
" Note, supra note 44, at 1659. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959)
(jurors' reading of newspaper articles unfavorable to defendant held sufficiently prejudicial
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process above the minimum requirements of the Constitution.49
Until 1960, the Court adhered to the judicial integrity rationale to
support its exercise of the power in the face of deliberate miscon-
duct by law enforcement officials.50
In Elkins v. United States, 51 the Court appeared to adopt de-
terrence as an additional rationale for suppressing evidence under
the supervisory power. In Elkins, the Court invoked its super-
visory power to exclude from a federal criminal prosecution evi-
dence seized by state officers whose violations of the fourth
amendment would have triggered the exclusionary rule had they
been federal officers. 52  While retaining the traditional judicial in-
to require new trial although trial court found no jurors prejudiced); Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (in certain cases, prosecution required to give defendant infor-
mation from its files for impeachment of prosecution witness); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.,
328 U.S. 217 (1946) (trial court denial of motion for new jury in civil trial reversed because
jury selection excluded wage earners in violation of federal law).
49 In McNabb, the Court stated "[Clivilized standards of procedure and evidence.
are not satisfied merely by observance of those minimal historic safeguards for securing
trial by reason which are summarized as 'due process of law' and below which we reach
what is really trial by force." 318 U.S. at 340.
50 Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), is
perhaps the most eloquent expression of the rationale:
The governing principle has long been settled. It is that a court will not redress
a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands. ....
... The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the
law in connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress.
Then aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to
maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration
of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination ...
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subject to the same rules of conduct that are commands of the citizen .... If
the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; ... it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end jus-
tifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 483-85 (footnotes omitted). See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956)
(Court has duty "to see that the waters of justice are not polluted"); Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956) ("[Flastidious regard for the
honor of the administration of justice requires the court to make certain that the doing of
justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
asserted."); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943) ("Plainly, a conviction rest-
ing on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Con-
gress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves
accomplices in willful disobedience of law.").
5' 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
.2 "What is here invoked is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of
criminal justice in the federal courts .... "Id. at 216. The Elkins Court expressly overruled
the "silver platter" doctrine of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 364 U.S. at
208. The Weeks Court distinguished between evidence rendered inadmissible in a federal
court because a federal agent obtained it in violation of the fourth amendment and evi-
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tegrity rationale of supervisory power,53 the Elkins Court also used
the exclusionary rule's rationale of deterrence 54 to support its ap-
plication of the supervisory power. A closer examination, how-
ever, suggests that Elkins' use of the deterrence rationale was a
temporary aberration to circumvent an earlier decision holding
that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule 5 did not apply to
state conduct.5 6  After establishing that the state officers had vio-
lated the fourth amendment, 57 the Elkins Court examined the
constitutional development of the federal exclusionary rule and
reasons for its extension to conduct by state agents. 58  The Court
appeared to regard the judicial integrity rationale as secondary
support for its decision. 59 Thus, the Elkins Court clearly intended
to effectuate fourth amendment guarantees. In prior supervisory
power decisions, the court had not used such a constitutionally
based analysis, but merely relied on the need to protect judicial
integrity. 60 Because the Court extended the exclusionary rule to
dence handed on a "silver platter" to federal agents by state officers who had acted on
their own in violation of the same rights. Id. at 398. The Weeks court excluded only the
evidence seized directly by the federal agent, because the fourth amendment was not then
enforceable against state conduct. Id.
53 364 U.S. at 222.
5" Id. at 217.
15 For a discussion of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, see notes 9-32 and
accompanying text supra.
56 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), the Court determined that the four-
teenth amendment extended the fourth amendment to limit conduct of state law enforce-
ment officers but did not require states to adopt the exclusionary rule to bar from state
courts evidence seized illegally by state officers. In Elkins the Court stated, "[N]othing could
be of greater relevance to the present inquiry than the underlying constitutional doctrine
which Wolf established. ... [T]hat the Federal Constitution, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers." 364 U.S. at
213.
57 364 U.S. at 207.
s Id. at 208-22. The Court discussed the exclusion of evidence strictly in the context of
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Id. at 218 ("The federal courts... have operated
under the exclusionary rule.., for almost half a century."); id. at 222 ("[I1n applying the
Fourth Amendment this Court has seldom shown itself unaware of the practical demands
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement."); id. ("[I1t can hardly be said that
in the over-all pattern of Fourth Amendment decisions this Court has been either unrealis-
tic or visionary.").
5' After discussing the fourth amendment rationales for exclusion for 14 pages of the
opinion, the Court added two pages of discussion of the judicial integrity rationale. Compare
id at 208-22 with id. at 222-23.
60 See, e.g., Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 3 (1956) ("The decision herein
passes only on the integrity of a criminal trial in the federal courts."); Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956) ("[Wie have then a case that raises not a constitutional ques-
tion but one concerning our supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies.");
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943) ("Quite apart from the Constitu-
tion ... we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners ... must
be excluded. ... [The arresting officers] subjected the accused to the pressures of a pro-
cedure... which tends to undermine the integrity of the criminal proceeding.").
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state trials just one year later,6 1 Elkins' application of the deter-
rence rationale to the supervisory power should be viewed as
merely the Court's final effort to avoid extending the exclusionary
rule to upset state convictions. Until the Court's decision in
Payner, then, the supervisory power and the exclusionary rule
were supported by distinct, separate rationales.
II
UNITED STATES V. PAYNER
During an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation of
American citizens' financial activities in the Bahamas, an IRS in-
former stole a briefcase belonging to a Bahamian bank official
who was visiting Miami. 62  Documents found in the briefcase pro-
vided leads resulting in a subpoena of Florida bank records that,
in turn, led to the indictment of Jack Payner on a charge of falsi-
fying his 1972 federal income tax return.6 3  The district court
61 In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the federal Constitution is inadmissible in a criminal
trial in a state court. The Court thus overruled that part of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), that held that the Constitution did not mandate state adherence to the exclusionary
rule. The Mapp Court reasoned that the constitutional prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures would be "a form of words" if unaccompanied by the exclusionary
rule. 367 U.S. at 655 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). "In short," the Mapp Court stated, "the admission of the
new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure." Id. at 656. The Court also noted its
recognition, one year earlier in Elkins, of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
Id.
62 The investigation, known as "Operation Trade Winds," began in 1965. In 1972, the
IRS focused on the Castle Bank and Trust Co. of Nassau, which investigators suspected
was an illegal tax haven for United States citizens. An IRS informer cultivated a friendship
with the vice-president of the bank and introduced him to a female detective. When the
informer learned that the bank official would carry bank records on a January 1973 trip to
Miami, the IRS agent in charge of the investigation approved the outline of the informer's
plan to acquire them. While the bank official and the female detective were at dinner, the
informer entered the latter's apartment and removed the bank official's briefcase. An IRS
agent supervised the copying of more than 400 documents from the briefcase. United
States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 118-20 (N.D. Ohio 1977), aff d, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir.
1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
63 The briefcase documents disclosed Payner's account in the Bahamian bank and
linked that bank with a Florida bank. A subpoena subsequently issued to the Florida bank
produced a loan agreement in which Payner pledged his Bahamian account as security for
a loan. The loan guarantee triggered an IRS investigation of Payner's 1972 tax return. 434
F. Supp. at 122.
Payner's indictment charged him with falsely stating on that return that he did not
have a foreign bank account, id. at 117-18, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976), which
provides in relevant part: "Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any depart-
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held that Payner lacked standing to object to the prosecution's use
of a Florida bank document as the fruit of the seizure that had
violated the Bahamian bank official's fourth amendment rights.6 4
The court, however, granted a defense motion to suppress the
Florida bank document under its supervisory power 65 and the
due process clause 66 of the fifth amendment.6 7  Stressing the
egregiousness of the IRS's behavior,68 the court invoked its super-
visory authority "to exclude evidence obtained by Governmental
conduct which is either purposefully illegal or motivated by an
intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right." 6 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed on the basis of the supervisory power, but did
not address the due process issue.7 0
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, held that the
district court had improperly exercised its supervisory power in
suppressing evidence otherwise admissible under the fourth
amendment. 7' Although commending the district court for its
ment or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully... makes any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statements or representations.... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
"' United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 125-26.
6 Id. at 135.
66 The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "No person shall be... deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONsT. amend V.
67 434 F. Supp. at 133. The district court stated: "Due Process requires exclusion of
reliable evidence only in those cases in which government officials obtain the challenged
materials in a grossly improper fashion... which exhibits their knowing and purposeful
bad faith hostility to any person's fundamental constitutional rights." Id. at 129 (footnote
omitted).
68 Id. at 130-33. The court found that the conduct of the government officials estab-
lished a prima facie case of larceny under Florida law. Id. at 130 n.66. The court stated:
The activities of the Government agents ... were Qutrageous. They plot-
ted, schemed and ultimately acted in contravention of the United States Con-
stitution and laws of Florida, knowing that their conduct was illegal. ....
•.. It is evident that the Government and its agents ... were, and are,
well aware that under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
evidence obtained from a party pursuant to an unconstitutional search is admis-
sible against third parties who's [sic] own privacy expectations are not subject to
the search, even though the cause for the unconstitutional search was to obtain
evidence incriminating those third parties.
Id. at 130-31 (footnotes omitted).
619 Id. at 134-35 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
6 United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
71 United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2446-47 (1980). The Court held, however,
that the district court correctly found that Payner lacked standing to invoke the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. Id. at 2444. The Court cited Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978), Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224 (1972), and Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364 (1968), in reaffirming its established position that a defendant may assert the fourth
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desire to deter misconduct by law enforcement officials, 2 Justice
Powell, writing for the majority,73 held that the interests of justice
do not require the suppression of all illegally seized evidence. 4
Rather, a court must weigh society's interest in enforcing "ideals
of governmental rectitude" against its interest in ascertaining the
truth in a criminal trial.75  A court must balance the same in-
terests when a defendant invokes the supervisory power as it does
when he invokes the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 76  Jus-
tice Powell observed that the Court's fourth amendment decisions
establish "beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the
instance of a party who was not the victim of the challenged prac-
tices." 7 The majority observed that if it failed to strike the same
final balance under the supervisory power, the judiciary would
have unbridled discretion to disregard "the considered limitations
of the law it is charged with enforcing." 78
III
PAYNER'S EFFECT ON THE SUPERVISORY POWER
In Pa)yner, the ever-shrinking exclusionary rule collided with
the supervisory power, a relatively unharnessed doctrine. Over
amendment only when his legitimate expectation of privacy, rather than that of a third
party, is violated by the government action. 100 S. Ct. at 2444. To support the proposition
that a bank customer had no expectation of privacy in bank records, the majority cited
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 100 S. Ct. at 2444. Although the district
court's due process holding was not before the Supreme Court, the Court indicated that
the same fourth amendment limitations would apply to the fifth amendment due process
clause if used as a ground for exercise of the supervisory power to exclude evidence. 100
S. Ct. at 2447 n.9; see note 90 infra.
72 Justice Powell wrote: "No court should condone the unconstitutional and possibly
criminal behavior of those who planned and executed this 'briefcase caper.'" 100 S. Ct. at
2445 (footnote omitted).
71 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined in
the opinion. Chief Justice Burger also filed a concurring opinion.
71 100 S. Ct. at 2445.
'5 Id. at 2445-46. The majority cited cases in which the suppression of "probative but
tainted evidence" would have exacted too high a toll upon the truth-finding function of the
courts. Id. at 2445. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978); United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-79 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 464, 489-91 (1976); Un-
ited States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
71 100 S. Ct. at 2446.
7 Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969)).
" 100 S. Ct. at 2447.
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the years, the Court has recognized that the exclusionary rule may
not deter misconduct, 79 yet has been reluctant to repudiate such
an entrenched principle. Instead, the Court has gradually re-
stricted the reach of the rule.80 The Payner decision represents a
logical accommodation of the supervisory power to these cutbacks
in the exclusionary rule. If the Court had not applied the restric-
tions of the exclusionary rule to limit the discretionary exercise of
supervisory power, trial courts might easily circumvent the estab-
lished balance between deterrence and truth-finding, at least in
cases of deliberate misconduct by law enforcement officials.81
To prevent this end run, the Payner Court shifted to the de-
terrence rationale-used in its previous exclusionary rule
decisions-to support the use of the supervisory power.8 2  Al-
19 In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960), the Court noted the unavailabil-
ity of empirical data on the efficacy of the exclusionary rule. The Court acknowledged
disagreement over the practical effect of the rule in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 n.5 (1973). In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court stated that research
on the rule's effect was available but inconclusive: "[W]e have assumed that the immediate
effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the Fourth
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens have voted to admit evi-
dence in every borderline exclusionary rule search and seizure case. Justice White often
joins them in their assault on the rule. See Note, Reason and the Fourth Amendment-The
Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1977). Chief justice
Burger, while a circuit judge, observed:
[H]ow can we think that a policeman will be deterred by a judicial ruling on
suppression of evidence which never affects him personally, and of which he
learns, if at all, long after he has forgotten the details of the particular episode
which occasioned suppression? This is an important issue which proponents of
deterrence-by-suppression must meet; it cannot be swept under the rug.
Burger, supra note 17, at 11.
Professor Oaks, who has made the most comprehensive study to date of exclusion's
deterrent effect, found no "empirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule." Oaks, supra note 17, at 709. He concludes that the exclusionary rule
fails as a deterrent. He does not, however, advocate immediate abolition of the rule, pre-
ferring to wait until courts and law enforcement officials fashion an alternative remedy. Id.
at 755.
80 See note 27 supra.
8' See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
82 The Court declared, "The values assigned to the competing interests do not change
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the supervisory power instead of
the Fourth Amendment." 100 S. Ct. at 2446-47. For a discussion of the Court's use of
interest-balancing to determine the reach of the exclusionary rule, see notes 27-32 and
accompanying text supra.
Because the text of the majority opinion does not specify the nature of those compet-
ing interests, it suggests that the Court balanced deterrence against truth-finding, rather
than deterrence as well as judicial integrity against truth-finding. The Court stated:
We certainly can understand the District Court's commendable desire to deter
deliberate intrusions into the privacy of persons who are unlikely to become
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though acknowledging that the judicial integrity rationale sup-
ported both doctrines, 83 the Court ignored prior decisions that
had established judicial integrity as the primary justification for
the supervisory power 84 and deterrence as the foundation of the
exclusionary rule.85  This construction enabled the Court to pre-
defendants in a criminal prosecution. ... Indeed, the decisions of this Court
are replete with denunciations of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the
name of law enforcement. But our cases also show that these unexceptional
principles do not command the exclusion of evidence in every case of illegality.
Instead, they must be weighed against the considerable harm that would flow
from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule.
... Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending application of
the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of government rectitude would im-
pede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury....
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the
supervisory power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third party's
constitutional rights.
100 S. Ct. at 2445-46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall argued that the
majority opinion ignored the judicial integrity rationale in its analysis of the supervisory
power. Id. at 2451-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Since the supervisory powers are exercised
to protect the integrity of the court, rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
defendant, it is hard to see why the Court today bases its analysis entirely upon Fourth
Amendment standing rules." Id. at 2452.
In a footnote responding to Marshall, the Court makes clear that it is balancing de-
terrence and judicial integrity against society's interest in truth-finding. Id. at 2446-47 n.8.
Although the District Court in this case relied upon a deterrent rationale, we
agree [with the dissent] that the supervisory power serves the "two-foid" pur-
pose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial integrity. As the dissent rec-
ognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule serves precisely
the same purposes. Thus, the... rule, like the supervisory power, is applied in
part "to protect the integrity of the court rather than to vindicate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant ...
Id. (citations omitted).
83 Id.
84 See notes 50-61 and accompanying text supra.
Even if the Court had viewed judicial integrity as the primary rationale for the super-
visory power and deterrence as a secondary concern, both interests arguably would not
have outweighed the interest in truth-finding, in light of the Court's emphasis on that
societal interest and its reluctance to exclude probative evidence even if obtained in viola-
tion of a defendant's fourth amendment rights. See 100 S. Ct. at 2445-46 ("The Court has
acknowledged that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll
upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case.... Our cases have consis-
tently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals
of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge
and jury." (citations omitted)). Where a third party's constitutional rights were infringed,
the Payner Court would not have ascribed greater weight to the interest of judicial integrity
under the supervisory power than it had ascribed to deterrence in similar circumstances
under the fourth amendment rule. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968);
note 27 supra. The Court, in fact, noted, "The supervisory power is applied with some
caution even when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights." 100 S. Ct. at 2446.
8" See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976) ("The primary justification for the
exclusionary rule.., is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth Amendment
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vent defendants from invoking the supervisory authority to
achieve what they could not accomplish through the exclusionary
rule.
The Payner Court may have overestimated the extent to
which the use of the supervisory power to exclude evidence would
upset the fourth amendment balance between deterrence and
truth-finding. The facts of Payner would limit such use of the
supervisory power to cases of deliberate law enforcement miscon-
duct. 6  Moreover, the discretionary nature of the supervisory
power would limit its exclusionary application; courts are never
compelled to exercise the power.87
Nonetheless, the Payner decision comports with the
generally held view that the exclusionary rule is judicially created
rather than constitutionally compelled. 8  Applying the supervi-
sory power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment would simply engraft one judicially created remedy
upon another to effectuate the same constitutional principle.
The Court's decision may render the supervisory power
superfluous,8" but only in the context of unreasonable searches
and seizures. Because the holding hinged on the Court's refusal to
upset its established fourth amendment balance between deter-
rights."); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("rule's prime purpose is to
deter future unlawful police conduct"); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969) ("deterrent aim of the rule").
86 See notes 68-69, and accompanying text supra.
87 In addition, federal courts' infrequent exercise of the supervisory power would have
further limited the effect of a contrary decision in Payner. The Supreme Court had not
used the power to exclude evidence since 1959, when deciding Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960).
88 See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
9 The Seventh Circuit does not so regard the supervisory power. In United States v.
Cortina, No. 79-2226 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 1980), the court exercised its supervisory power to
exclude from evidence corporate records seized pursuant to a fraudulently obtained search
warrant. The trial court found that an FBI agent had lied in an affidavit presented to a
magistrate to support the search warrant. The court also concluded that without this delib-
erate misrepresentation, the FBI would not have made the requisite showing of probable
cause. Affirming the district court's use of supervisory power, the court of appeals stated
that the "fraud upon the judicial system" required suppression.
Cortina may be regarded as an "end run" around established fourth amendment doc-
trine proscribed by the Supreme Court in Payner. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 138, 140-48
(1978), the Court held that a defendant must demonstrate a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" in evidence he seeks to exclude under the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.
See note 27 supra. The prosecution asserted in Cortina that because defendants could not
demonstrate such an expectation of privacy in the seized corporate records, the trial court
erred in excluding the evidence. The Cortina court rejected this argument, and declined to
import the fourth amendment requirement to limit the exercise of its supervisory power:
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rence and truth-finding, lower courts need not extend the holding
to statutory violations or, arguably, to other constitutional provi-
sions." In such contexts, judicial integrity may remain the pri-
The Payner decision ... did not hold that defendants must establish a legitimate
expectation of privacy to invoke the supervisory powers if it is proven that the
challenged evidence was seized from defendants. By invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation of privacy under our circumstances, the government
would interpret Payner to hold that the scope of the supervisory power is iden-
tical to that of the fourth amendment. But had it so held, Payner would have
rendered the supervisory power superfluous in cases involving searches and
seizures, a result the Supreme Court expressly rejected.
United States v. Cortina, No. 79-2226 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 1980).
By refusing to adopt the fourth amendment requirement of "legitimate expectation of
privacy," the Seventh Circuit arguably succeeds in making an "end run" around established
fourth amendment doctrine. Yet the Seventh Circuit's decision is defensible on other
grounds. The Cortina court distinguished Payner by implicitly adopting a two-tiered analysis
of the interests of judicial integrity. On the first tier was the wrongful conduct itself-the
burglary in Payner and the false statement in Cortina. On the second tier was the pros-
ecutor's attempt to admit the tainted evidence. On the second tier, Payner and Cortina are
indistinguishable;- the threat to judicial integrity is equally strong in both cases. Thus
viewed solely on this level, the Cortina decision may appear incongruous. Yet it is on the
first tier, the violation of an individual's rights, that the roles of judicial integrity-and
thus the two decisions-may be distinguished.
In Cortina, the court emphasized that the agent's offense "was committed within the
sanctity of the Court itself." United States v. Cortina, No. 79-2226 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 1980).
The court sharply focused on the first tier: "[i]t is the ... truth-finding function itself
which has been corrupted, not because of suppression, but because of the lies told to the
magistrate." Id. The involvement of the judicial machinery in the first-tier violation distin-
guishes Cortina from Payner.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cortina creates an anomaly. The Payner
Court would require admission of evidence obtained in violation of a third party's rights.
Yet Cortina would require suppressing the same evidence if it had been obtained as a result
of a fraudulently-obtained search warrant. The message of these cases is that law enforce-
ment officials need only eschew the judicial machinery entirely to obtain admissible evi-
dence if the), cannot support the issuance of a warrant with probable cause.
"0 Payner's holding would not extend to the exercise of the supervisory power to
exclude evidence obtained in violation of federal statutes. For example, in McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), revenue agents obtained confessions during prolonged
questioning without giving defendants preliminary hearings immediately upon arrest as
required by federal statute. Id. at 333-38, 342. Although the statute did not explicitly re-
quire suppression of evidence in contravention of its provisions, the Court used its super-
visory power to exclude the confessions because "[t]he circumstances in which the state-
ments ... were secured reveal plain disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress upon
federal law officers." Id. at 344. The Court found exclusion essential to avoid making "the
courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." Id. at 345. Cf. United States
v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (evidence obtained in violation of agency regulation not
excluded because neither statute nor constitution mandated regulation); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 186 (1956) and Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (verdicts in both
cases set aside because wage earners and women had been excluded from juries contrary to
federal jury selection laws).
If lower courts ignore the Court's footnote application of fourth amendment limita-
tions to fifth amendment due process as a ground for exercise of the supervisory power,
100 S. Ct. at 2447 n.9 ("[T]he fact remains that 'the limitations of the Due Process
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mary rationale underlying the supervisory power. Even if given
an expansive reading, the Payner decision will, at most, cause
courts to exercise their supervisory powers cautiously in areas
where the Supreme Court has expressed clear policy choices, as it
has in its fourth amendment balance. '"
Critics may argue that the Payner decision will encourage de-
liberate unlawful conduct by law enforcement officials by allowing
use of evidence resulting from such conduct. The exclusionary
rule's negligible deterrent effect on police conduct, :2 however,
suggests that a decision to admit unlawfully obtained evidence
would not appreciably encourage illegal conduct by law enforce-
men't officials. '93  Moreover, the threat of a Bivens-type damage
suit 94 brought by a third party may counteract any encouragement
Clause ... come into play only when the government activity in question violates some
protected right of the defendant."' (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490
(1976)), then the due process clause still provides a basis for the suppression of evidence
seized through willful governmental misconduct. If, however, lower courts embrace the
dicta, it will preclude them from excluding evidence seized in violation of a third party's
due process rights, even if the governmental misconduct shocks their conscience, and will
forbid suppression of evidence through the supervisory power that could not otherwise be
suppressed under the due process clause.
9t We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize a federal court to
suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlaw-
fully from a third party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment deci-
sions have established beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a
party who was not the victim of the challenged practices.
100 S. Ct. at 2446 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
'2 See note 79 supra.
"a The Court expressly condemned the behavior of the IRS. See note 72 supra. The
Court also noted that Congress investigated the IRS's "improprieties." 100 S. Ct. at 2445
n.5. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and Narcotics Traffickers Tax
Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue responded
by halting "Operation Trade Winds" and adopting guidelines designed to curb future
abuses.
"a In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was "entitled to recover money dam-
ages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the [Fourth]
Amendment." Id. at 397. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger predicted that this private
tort remedy would not deter misconduct because jurors might "refuse to penalize a police
officer at the behest of a person they believe to be a 'criminal.'" Id. at 422. If the plaintiff
were a third party, however, he would not face the same obstacle as a defendant in recov-
ering damages.
Burger proposed a statutory remedy in which citizens would sue the federal govern-
ment, rather than law enforcement officers, in a federal tribunal. Id. at 422-24. For a
discussion of the ineffectiveness of the Bivens-type action and other alternatives, see Note,
"Damages or Nothing" -The Efficacy of the Bivens-Tpe Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 667 (1979).
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Payner might give to police lawlessness. Critics may also argue that
the decision denigrates judicial integrity by virtually ignoring it as
a rationale. Yet because society's confidence in the judicial process
contributes to judicial integrity, that integrity may suffer more
when a court lets a guilty defendant go free than if it admits
tainted evidence, especially when the taint does not stem from a
violation of the defendant's rights.
CONCLUSION
Payner presented the Court with a choice between preserving
established limits on the fourth amendment exclusionary rule and
allowing defendants to circumvent those limits by invoking the
federal court's supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained
through deliberate governmental misconduct violating the rights
of third parties. To maintain those limits, the Court erased the
distinction established in prior decisions between the rationales
underlying the exclusionary rule and the supervisory power. This
doctrinal integration enabled the Court to preserve its established
fourth amendment balance between the interests in truth-finding
and deterrence of governmental misconduct. Nonetheless, had the
Court upheld the use of the supervisory power to exclude illegally
obtained evidence, the discretionary nature of the power and the
limits imposed by the facts in Payner would have enabled only a
few defendants to evade the boundaries of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule. Payner may render the supervisory power
superfluous, but only in the context of unconstitutional searches
and seizures; its holding need not extend to statutory violations.
Nancy I. Ruskin
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